Monday, October 18, 2010

Some Aspects of the Military Industrial Complex: Notes by Sidney Lens and Others



1970

What is the Military-Industrial Complex?  The term is attributed to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who warned in his “farewell address” that “the Military-Industrial Complex” was to be gravely regarded because “potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist”.  The military influence, according to Eisenhower,  “is felt in every city, every state house, every office of federal government”.1  But what is the meaning of this term?  Sidney Lens attempts to answer this question in his book The Military-Industrial Complex.
Before looking at what he found, let’s take a brief look at the author.  Sidney Lens originally came from Newark, New Jersey and for much of his early adulthood was associated with organized labor.  After turning to journalism, he traveled through 74 countries and interviewed many heads of state and policy makers  His books have concentrated on political and labor difficulties and include: Left, Right and Center; The Counterfeit Revolution; Crisis of American Labor and The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism in the United States.2
The Military-Industrial Complex originally appeared in “The National Catholic Reporter”.  This article was revised into book form and released in 1970.  Structured into eight chapters, each chapter treats a specific aspect of the “Complex”. 
In the first chapter, entitled “Unmasking the Goliath”, Lens attempts to show how the military had appropriated funds from Congress without question or challenge until the Vietnam War begged the question of military effectiveness.  Congress began searching for some answers and uncovered great  waste in spending by the military.  The most glaring example being the cost jump for a deep submersible rescue vessel ordered by the Navy.  Originally quoted at a cost of $36.5 million for twelve, the later estimate became 4480 million for six; and Senator Proxmire maintained that in the last 40 years, there was only one instance where such a vessel could have been used.3  Despite such overruns on cost, and many cases of plain shoddy work, the same industrial outfits continued to receive large military orders.  The large number of former military officers serving on the executive staffs of many of these industries may or may not have anything to do  with the situation, but the possible morass of corruption hinted at by Lens’ figures suggest a second instance to use a deep submersible rescue vessel.
“Origins and Purpose” is the second chapter.  Herein, Lens traces the development of the military-industrial complex from a very secondary influence before World War II to a major influence on United States policy after the war.  He questions the basis of this influence by questioning the actual Soviet threat in the early period of the cold war as well as just  side, east or west, was most guilty of treaty breaking.  Our proposed objective of self-government for other countries is shown to hide courser objectives; not human rights, but mineral rights.  Out statement that we only wish for other countries to control their own destiny proves to be feckless if under our breath we say, but we will control their fortunes.
In chapter five, Lens raises the question of “Self-fulfilling Strategies”.  Pointedly, this is the ability to construct a strategy that forces the circumstances that prove the necessity of that particular strategy.  One sample given is the Cuban missile-crisis of 1962, when President Kennedy had the famous eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the Soviets.  It has been put forth by some that this crisis arose out of the United States own weapons strategy.  The strategy referred to was “city-sparing”, which the Soviets allegedly took as an indication that the U. S. would attack first, so the Soviets stepped-up their own weapon displacements.4 
As proposed, the “city-sparing” plan did not claim any strike-first objective.  It was supposed to be a sane approach to nuclear war.  the plan was invented by the Air Force, over the objections of its own high command.  The objections were not quite as harsh as the General who stated: “Let’s start killing people.  People need to respect the United States, and when we start killing people, then there will be more respect for the United States.”5  But they were of a more punitive nature that the proposed idea.  However, Secretary of defense, Robert McNamara backed the “city-sparing strategy” and it was adopted.  According to the designers, it should spare the lives of 100 million Americans in an all-out nuclear war, presuming both sides used it.  If one side only planned to use it, it worked better as a strike-first strategy.6
In Lens’ other chapters, he digests rather extensively researched facts as support for his argument.  Each chapter takes a specific problematic aspect of the “Complex”.  The military influence on labor, on academia, on the solving or lack of solving of internal problems, on government secrecy, dishonesty and censorship.  It is interesting to consider lens’ work in light of some conclusions drawn by Richard J. Barnet, Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Studies and former member of the State department, in his book, with the very succinct title, The Economy of Death.
The building of a Warrior State threatens a nation’s own values, especially freedom.  A nation which spends a great deal of its resources on a military establishment at the avoidance of confronting domestic problems faces civil disorders/  If a nation decides it cannot deal with the causes of this disorder, it must seek to suppress it.  If a nation will not base security on the consent of the governed, it will base security on detention camps and graveyards.  And a nation, which devotes its funds to instruments of violence, gives an example to its citizens on how to solve problems.  “Law and order speeches make little impact when those in authority seek order primarily through force.”7
Lens offers some “Alternatives to Catastrophe” in his final chapter.  he lists a seven-point program for lessening the power of the military-industrial complex and furthering peace and freedom in the world. 
1. End military aid to foreign countries. 
2. Increase aid for social reform. 
3. The aid should be given through the United Nations as a step in strengthening that body. 
4. The United States should “nationalize” American firms operating on foreign soil and make them government-to-government ventures.
5. Encourage cooperation between small nations, aiding their development by lessening dual-effort. 
6. Move toward disarmament, since the temptation of having weapons is to use those weapons. 
7. Suggest programs at home, which are alternatives to militarism, such as attacking poverty, racism and so forth.8
Lens’ contentions can best be summarized with a simple quotation, for Lens finds a strong military-industrial complex existing and approval of by large segments of our culture.  We are asked to delight in our strength.  But in light of Lens’ information we must ask if “the heart of the wise should be in the house of mourning; but the heart of fools is in the house of mirth.”9  Whether Lens’ proposals will be adopted, or whether they are the best solutions, is left hanging in the air.  But it seems certain from known facts that the “Military-Industrial Complex” will continue searching for greater weapons.  And the possibility of a “doomsday machine” lies within our hands.  It is possible to launch twelve satellites into orbit about the earth, each containing a nuclear warhead.  If these twelve warheads were to be exploded while circling above our heads, they would have the same effect as four simultaneous major volcanic eruptions.  The result of both or either is the same; the end of all life on earth.10



NOTES:  SOME ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

1 Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 5.  Lundberg quotes Eisenhower’s farewell address.
2 “Liner Notes”, The Futile Crusade, back cover.
3 Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex (Kansas City, Missouri: Pilgrim Press, 1970) p. 5, hereafter referred to as Lens.
4 Lens, pp. 91-92.
5 Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 64, hereafter referred to as Barnet.
6 Richard Fryklund, 100 Million Lives (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 18-32.
7 Barnet, pp. 8-10
8 Lens, pp. 155-159.
9 Ecclesiastics, King James Bible (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., n.d.), 7, 4, p. 601.
10 “The End of the World”, Franklin Institute (Philadelphia: Fels Planetarium, 1968).

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