On Meaninglessness

1968

         It would seem in the verifiability principle the notion of meaninglessness is pivotal.  That is, the meaninglessness notion is basic for its acceptance, or if we can dispute the notion of meaninglessness used by the logical positivists, we can then dispute the verifiability principle.  Of course, the logical positivist will probably argue back at us if we question the term of meaninglessness saying we are dealing in metaphysics ourselves and therefore are talking nonsense.  This is a great problem in itself with the logical positivist’s verifiability principle.  It is self-protective.  Let me use a clearer example of what I mean.  A faith healer says he cured someone, but then the person says they were not cured and accuses the faith healer of being a fake.  "Not at all," says the faith healer, "I’m not a fake.  You just didn’t believe hard enough."  This may seem a good argument, being one that cannot be disputed and thus is exactly the thing that happens with the verifiability principle.  However, there seems to be a shortcoming to the principle.  And that is in determining where to draw the line between speculation and verifiability.

         Is it meaningful or meaningless for me to say the world is round?  It is meaningful, because after all, the world is round, and I could fly around it and see that it was round.  But was it meaningful or not to say the world was round in 1490?  It was in dispute at the time.  Many people apparently believed the world was flat, that it had edges, yet some people believed it was round.  Was it then nonsense to think it was round and you could sail around it if you had a boat strong enough and supplies enough?  Was it not metaphysical to discuss the possibility that the world was round when it was believed by the science of the time to be flat?  It could be said that it wasn’t because soon afterward a man did sail about the world and prove it round, but this is after the fact.  Was it not nonsense to say the world was round when it could not be verified by experience?  Yet, there were clues.  The curve of the sky, for one, and probably observations of the moon, but these did not really verify anything about the shape of the earth.  The point of all this is how does one know what is metaphysical and what is not?  To speculate about God would be metaphysical, but there are clues which would lead one to believe in God, and other clues to cause speculation on the nature of this God.  But is to speak of God nonsense because we cannot bring him over and introduce him?  Is it any more nonsensical to speak of the soul of God or the limits of space then it was to believe the world was round in 1490?

         To clear up this point, we can look back to Socrates and Memo.  In a way, they begin with the same argument - Whether it is possible to inquire after knowledge or not.  To discuss metaphysics is not nonsense, for metaphysics is an attempt to explain something that is real.  It is often really an inquiry after the facts and sometimes it is verified at some later time.  To limit discussion to that which is verifiable at once is to really limit inquiry and hamper discovery.  There is one other thing or point to say against the verifiability principle.  If I say God’s son died on a cross, a logical positivist would be able to say that is nonsense, because I cannot verify it.  I could then claim it is verified by the Bible, which quotes eyewitnesses to its happening and to events of miracles performed by God’s son as proof of His claim.  The logical positivist could say that I cannot verify their accounts.  But I could say that is to say George Washington was the first President of the United States was nonsense on the same ground.

         In other words, the main objective to this principle is too narrow, too restrictive and too circular.

For a definition and explanation of the "Verifiability Principle", click on the title of this post.