Monday, October 18, 2010

Is This Rationalist Really Necessary?







  

1968







                                                                                                             
            Hume does not seem concerned with finding any one certain truth, nor does he seem concerned with any philosophy of A Priori.  In fact, he disputes any such thing as necessary truth.  Such a thing is irrelevant to our existence. To argue the question of existence is irrelevant.  Existence cannot be proved by any argument and will end in circular discussion.  It is not, however, that Hume completely dismisses A Priori.  He says it has nothing to do with the world.  It has to do with the relations of ideas, but nothing to do with the world, for even if some point is granted A priori, such as a square always having four equal sides, did not exist in reality it would still be what its laws dictate it to be in conception.
            We have matters of fact, however, that do exist and are relevant.  But they are not A priori and cannot be discovered by reason alone, deduced in isolation.  They must be experienced, and even then they are not, like a priori, indisputable.  To make a statement of fact about the world, such as “fire is hot” is not to be unable to question the statement.  We know fire is hot only through our experience with fire, but it could not be wrong for someone to say that fire is cold. It would be possible that fire is cold if we had never experienced its hotness.  It is not altogether inconceivable that there could be a fire that would feel cold to our bodies.  Some fire might feel cool when we are ill.  We could say the moon is made of green cheese, for though it is improbable, it is not impossible.  It would be possible to argue the statement that I think not, therefore, I am not.  If I make the statement I think not, who can dispute me, since only I can experience my own thoughts, or the lack of them?  Of course, it could be claimed that to say I think not is to think it and therefore is a contradiction.
            Hume is concerned with cause and effect.  He feels that philosophers have generally attributed actions within the world to the operation of cause and effect, but that such relations cannot be proved.  We observe an action, such as a billiard ball striking another of its kind, and we come to expect a certain reaction, but it is only through experience that we know that one particular action will take place.  It would not be wrong to say that the cue ball will strike the eight ball and the eight ball will remain stationary while the cue ball flies off the table.  Such an event would happen if the eight ball were nailed to the table.  We cannot make any certain statement from this knowledge without further experience; that of observing what does happen.  What if the nail is very loose in the wood?  What will happen?  Will the nail hold or not? We cannot know without experiencing it.  Of course, we could argue that some things are cause and effect and we can be certain of some particular thing occurring again if it has been observed exactly that way every time in the pass.  But here we delude ourselves in two ways.  One, we often become so used to a certain effect we start believing it is A Priori and not experience showing us what will happen.  And two, we believe it will always happen the same way over and over when something is similar.  We would expect a large ripe apple to taste good and juicy but if we bite into it, we discover a wax replica, which will not taste good and juicy.  Here was a similar object that did not behave as we expected, a matter of fact that we learn only through experience.  By the same token, it is not wrong to say Hume was wrong.  Who is experienced in all knowledge?

For more on David Hume and his philosophic viewpoints, click on the title of this post. It will take you to, History of Philosophy -- David Hume by Alfred Weber

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