Monday, October 18, 2010
Memo to Socrates on Socrates to Memo
I
Fledgling Philosophies
1968
Socrates attempted to show that knowledge is but recollection in his Memo. He appeared to succeed, but it can be asked whether he actually did. He supported his theory by using a young slave boy to demonstrate what he was attempting to prove, but did this create a fallacy in his argument. Just how cooperative was the slave to the two men who were his masters? When the boy did what Socrates asked of him was it proof of Socrates’ theory of knowledge as recollection, or was it simply the slave’s attempt to please his masters? This unanswerable question weakens Socrates method. A second problem exists in the method itself. Although Socrates denied any interference with the lad’s thinking; throughout, he led the boy along.
“Yes, Socrates, it was.”
“Then was it not?”
“Yes, Socrates, it was.”
“And, then would not this be the case?”
“Oh indeed, Socrates, it shall be.”
Socrates got to where he wished to go, but did the boy lead him or did he lead the boy? Because of this question Socrates’ method is weakened, for it is impossible to say if Socrates really succeeded in his proof. And, of course, if his proof is weakened, it also weakens his idea of a soul existing before and after death, or at least, before life.
Still, there is another argument being considered in his dialogue: whether or not knowledge can be pursued. After all, Memo asked at the beginning if it could. He said, if you know, you need not inquire, but if you do not know, you cannot inquire. Socrates really set out to show Memo why this statement was wrong. In this he did succeed. It was not that the slave knew geometry from recollection at all, but that he knew a little about the subject and that he did agree with Socrates to please his masters; and thus, Socrates made the lad realize what he did not know, while at the same time, showed him he could learn if he tried.
In essence, Socrates showed that to know about something and to not know something, does not mean you know everything or are unable to know anything. In fact, he showed you must first know what you do not know about something before you can begin to try to know it. And in this argument, Socrates succeeded.
(Click on the title of this post for more on Socrates.)
Why Kant There be A Priori?
WHY KANT THERE BE A PRIORI?
There is no A Priori Knowledge:
i.) All knowledge comes from experience.
ii.) But knowledge, which is based on experience, can only be probable, and not certain.
iii.) A Priori Knowledge is supposed to be certain and necessary.
iv.) Therefore, there is no A Priori Knowledge.
I will defend this argument. Basically, I will use two examples of Kant’s to defend this argument. One is that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line and the second is A + B is greater than A.
All knowledge comes from experience. We know a triangle has three sides from observing triangles. A triangle is a basic building block. It is probably true that the triangle was discovered through trial and error. Later, somebody called it a triangle and defined it as any figure having tri-angles formed by three joining sides. Certainly we know that all triangles have three sides, but not A Priori. We know from observing a triangle and being told all figures of this type have three sides. We cannot define something with a definition, and yet triangle = three sides joined together is just that if we try to argue it is A Priori Knowledge.
By the same token, it is not certain, except by definition, and definitions are only probable, for we cannot experience all they define and must accept the definition for their basic truth after all.
If we take two examples used by Kant in Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, we will be able to see that experience is the only way to knowledge and that something considered A Priori can be uncertain. For one thing, we generally say 1 + 1 = 2 is a priori. But is 1 + 1 = 2 true in base two? That is simply a different set of numeric values, or a different definition of the same equation, but then, doesn’t that bring us back to our argument that A Priori depends on definition rather than definition being A Priori? If this is unclear at this point, let’s consider Kant’s claim that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. This is A Priori, for it is obvious in itself, is it not? Not at all, for we must know not only the concepts of straight and points and distance, but we must know the conditions under which we wish to make the statement. If it is two points upon the Earth’s surface, then a curved line is the shortest distance between two points because of the Earth’s curve. And even in space, there can be some doubt, because some argue that space is curved. So it is not certain, but only probable that the shortest distance between two points in space is a straight line. And we can never be certain this is always true since we cannot follow the line to two points at the very ends of the universe.
If there is still any doubt that experience is necessary for knowledge, let’s examine Kant’s other example: A + B is greater than A. This is obvious, is it not? It is not. We can show that this is not very simply. Just line up all the numbers along side all even numbers. Which is longer? Is it the line containing all the numbers or the line containing only the even numbers? Well, they are both infinities, so in this case the whole may be equaled by the part. (Notice we say may, for we can never line up all the numbers and all the even numbers in order to be sure.) In other words, we can’t actually experience the equation A + B is greater than A, if A = all numbers and B = all even numbers.
Lastly, let’s consider Kant’s proposition that all bodies are extended, or at least, his concept of substance. He has us strip away all that our senses show us, somewhat as Descartes did, but in the end, he says we have to recognize the space that the substance occupied. But this space is actually nothingness. We cannot recognize this space, for we cannot conceive of a concept of nothingness, for we have never experienced nothingness. We only know something. In fact, we define nothing as the absence of anything. We do not say anything is the absence of nothing. We do not even recognize nothing, except by the presence of something. Nothingness is contained within the borders of something, and in this way, even a hole becomes something. This may seem a circular argument, and it is, but it does show that a doubt exists and even nothingness is only a probability unless we actually experience it.
In light of this and its application to our other examples, which can be done by us, and by the fact that I cannot prove it, because I cannot apply it to all examples of A priori Knowledge; therefore, there is no A Priori Knowledge.
For more information on Immanuel Kant, click on the title of this post.
Just Hume Kant be Modified?
Just Hume Kant be Modified?
1968
Where as David Hume took the position that A Priori Knowledge is not concerned with anything in the world, Kant argues that A Priori Knowledge is very necessary to our understanding of the world and to empirical knowledge itself. Kant divides our knowledge into two categories, which he calls synthetic and analytic. Analytic judgment is that in which the predicate can readily be deduced from the subject. Kant’s example is that all bodies are extended, a fact he claims is known because being extended is bound up with the concept of body. A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate is an additive to the subject which can only be asserted through observation and experience, and his example of this is all bodies have weight. In other words, empirical knowledge is synthetic and A Priori Knowledge is analytic. Of course, we can argue that in his example the concept of extension is as elusive to pure reason as the concept of weight. Would not one have to see that bodies do extend into space to know that they extend into space? A blind man in a free-gravity area would have no more conception of his extension then he would of his weight.
This would be a small and mote point, except it argues against Kant’s very basic claim, and if so, weakens his whole. However, let us consider that his analytic and synthetic knowledge is completely acceptable. How is A Priori valuable to our world? Kant tells us it is valuable because it is the basic beginning for the synthetic. That is, if we strip away each layer of our synthetic knowledge, we always come back to another question that leads to another on to another and eventually we come to one that we accept some knowledge not from experience, but from A Priori.
Kant finds A Priori to be both necessary and outside our experience. He uses as an example the equation 5 + 7 = 12. We cannot experience this equation in itself, but yet we accept it, and we know it is set and unchangeable. We could examine five by building to five on our fingers, and seven by laying down sticks, and from this we could begin seeing the twelve, but in itself it stands alone. Yet, is this as it seems? That is, first, is 5 + 7 = 12 really seen intuitively or through A Priori, or is it accepted as final proof of already gathered experience? Five fingers and seven sticks equals twelve has been experienced so often that the acceptance of 5 + 7 = 12 is automatic, but posteriori. Consider the equation 2 + 3 = 5. By Kant’s argument this would be A Priori, for we deduce the predicate from the subject, but where have we deduced the actual proposition 5? The Hottentots can only count to three. After three is many. Do we have A Priori that 2 + 3 = many? No, for we would not be certain that five is many. Can the Hottentots look at 2 + 3 = 5 and know it A Priori? No, not unless he can learn the concept of five, which is still agreeable to the definition of A Priori. But to learn the concept of five, he would have to experience it. Two fingers, three, four, five; ah, five! Two fingers, he understands, and three also, and now five! If he holds up these two, it is two, and now these other three, and it is five! He just experienced 2 + 3 = 5. But if he held up two and just put them down, and then held up three and put them down, he may never see five, although he might understand the concept. He must experience it.
For information on David Hume, click on the title of this post.
Distinctions Hume Kant Miss!
DISTINCTIONS HUME KANT MISS!
1968
The relationship between Hume and Kant’s distinctions can be briefly summed-up by making a small chart and placing within it the ideas, or rather the theories, of each man under the headings. It is not intended that this chart force a strict adherence to any set rule or category. It is obvious that there are differences in the meaning of each category, but we are trying to show simply how Kant and Hume are similar. In a way, they were working within the same theory, only differing to the degree to which they extended each part. For instance, Hume accepted A Priori, but felt it had no real concern in the real world, while Kant felt that A Priori Knowledge was very necessary to our understanding of the world. One could almost agree with both, if it was not a contradiction to do so. In the end, Kant had the sounder theory. And that is the main difference between them, for it is in a contradiction. Hume felt A Priori Knowledge, which he called matter of fact, was of no concern because there was nothing we could do about it. Kant called A Priori analytic in his theory, but argued that it was necessary, not that we could do anything about it, but that certain knowledge that was A Priori was important to our understanding of certain sciences and events in out world. In other words, the difference between Kant and Hume was that Hume felt A Priori was not concerned with the real world and Kant felt it was necessary for a real understanding of the real world.
The similarities between the two theories are shown in the chart below by relation of category under A priori and Empirical knowledge.
A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE | EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
_________________________________________________________ HUME matter of fact | relations of ideas
_________________________________________________________ KANT analytic | synthetic
_________________________________________________________
Is This Rationalist Really Necessary?
1968
Hume does not seem concerned with finding any one certain truth, nor does he seem concerned with any philosophy of A Priori. In fact, he disputes any such thing as necessary truth. Such a thing is irrelevant to our existence. To argue the question of existence is irrelevant. Existence cannot be proved by any argument and will end in circular discussion. It is not, however, that Hume completely dismisses A Priori. He says it has nothing to do with the world. It has to do with the relations of ideas, but nothing to do with the world, for even if some point is granted A priori, such as a square always having four equal sides, did not exist in reality it would still be what its laws dictate it to be in conception.
We have matters of fact, however, that do exist and are relevant. But they are not A priori and cannot be discovered by reason alone, deduced in isolation. They must be experienced, and even then they are not, like a priori, indisputable. To make a statement of fact about the world, such as “fire is hot” is not to be unable to question the statement. We know fire is hot only through our experience with fire, but it could not be wrong for someone to say that fire is cold. It would be possible that fire is cold if we had never experienced its hotness. It is not altogether inconceivable that there could be a fire that would feel cold to our bodies. Some fire might feel cool when we are ill. We could say the moon is made of green cheese, for though it is improbable, it is not impossible. It would be possible to argue the statement that I think not, therefore, I am not. If I make the statement I think not, who can dispute me, since only I can experience my own thoughts, or the lack of them? Of course, it could be claimed that to say I think not is to think it and therefore is a contradiction.
Hume is concerned with cause and effect. He feels that philosophers have generally attributed actions within the world to the operation of cause and effect, but that such relations cannot be proved. We observe an action, such as a billiard ball striking another of its kind, and we come to expect a certain reaction, but it is only through experience that we know that one particular action will take place. It would not be wrong to say that the cue ball will strike the eight ball and the eight ball will remain stationary while the cue ball flies off the table. Such an event would happen if the eight ball were nailed to the table. We cannot make any certain statement from this knowledge without further experience; that of observing what does happen. What if the nail is very loose in the wood? What will happen? Will the nail hold or not? We cannot know without experiencing it. Of course, we could argue that some things are cause and effect and we can be certain of some particular thing occurring again if it has been observed exactly that way every time in the pass. But here we delude ourselves in two ways. One, we often become so used to a certain effect we start believing it is A Priori and not experience showing us what will happen. And two, we believe it will always happen the same way over and over when something is similar. We would expect a large ripe apple to taste good and juicy but if we bite into it, we discover a wax replica, which will not taste good and juicy. Here was a similar object that did not behave as we expected, a matter of fact that we learn only through experience. By the same token, it is not wrong to say Hume was wrong. Who is experienced in all knowledge?
For more on David Hume and his philosophic viewpoints, click on the title of this post. It will take you to, History of Philosophy -- David Hume by Alfred Weber
How 'Bout Holbach
HOW ‘BOUT HOLBACH?
1968
"In whatever manner man is considered, he is connected to universal nature, and submitted to the necessary and immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings she contains, according to their peculiar essences or to the respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows each particular species.” -- Holbach.?
If we objectively examine the events of life, our own and others, we could begin to see at least some justification for Holbach’s statement. What can we find that is not determined by something outside ourselves and what does not revert to the nature of our species? We behave in some manner or other because of the reaction to such behavior in our childhood. We did it then and received a reaction. Either the reaction was negative, and we ceased doing whatever it was we had done, or the reaction was positive, and we continued doing it. Perhaps a simple way of knowing that the statement is true is by taking notice of how we live our lives. We would find we do not really decide on a course of action, but actually react to action brought against us. We work because we must eat. We must eat so we do not die. If we do try to decide on our way of life, we suffer from conflict and neurosis, and then we either return to what is expected of us or we become slaves to our neurosis. Or consider this examination or that in college. Why do we take them? Why not just say: Oh, I don’t feel like doing it, I’m tired, I’m busy, I’ve a cold, or some such thing? We take the tests because they are necessary to pass the courses. And we take the courses because they are necessary to meet the requirements of our degree. And we seek the degree because it is necessary to gain certain employment. And we seek employment because we must earn money to live. And we seek certain employment because of some factor in our background. In other words, we react to nature and events and that determines our life.
On Meaninglessness
1968
It would seem in the verifiability principle the notion of meaninglessness is pivotal. That is, the meaninglessness notion is basic for its acceptance, or if we can dispute the notion of meaninglessness used by the logical positivists, we can then dispute the verifiability principle. Of course, the logical positivist will probably argue back at us if we question the term of meaninglessness saying we are dealing in metaphysics ourselves and therefore are talking nonsense. This is a great problem in itself with the logical positivist’s verifiability principle. It is self-protective. Let me use a clearer example of what I mean. A faith healer says he cured someone, but then the person says they were not cured and accuses the faith healer of being a fake. "Not at all," says the faith healer, "I’m not a fake. You just didn’t believe hard enough." This may seem a good argument, being one that cannot be disputed and thus is exactly the thing that happens with the verifiability principle. However, there seems to be a shortcoming to the principle. And that is in determining where to draw the line between speculation and verifiability.
Is it meaningful or meaningless for me to say the world is round? It is meaningful, because after all, the world is round, and I could fly around it and see that it was round. But was it meaningful or not to say the world was round in 1490? It was in dispute at the time. Many people apparently believed the world was flat, that it had edges, yet some people believed it was round. Was it then nonsense to think it was round and you could sail around it if you had a boat strong enough and supplies enough? Was it not metaphysical to discuss the possibility that the world was round when it was believed by the science of the time to be flat? It could be said that it wasn’t because soon afterward a man did sail about the world and prove it round, but this is after the fact. Was it not nonsense to say the world was round when it could not be verified by experience? Yet, there were clues. The curve of the sky, for one, and probably observations of the moon, but these did not really verify anything about the shape of the earth. The point of all this is how does one know what is metaphysical and what is not? To speculate about God would be metaphysical, but there are clues which would lead one to believe in God, and other clues to cause speculation on the nature of this God. But is to speak of God nonsense because we cannot bring him over and introduce him? Is it any more nonsensical to speak of the soul of God or the limits of space then it was to believe the world was round in 1490?
To clear up this point, we can look back to Socrates and Memo. In a way, they begin with the same argument - Whether it is possible to inquire after knowledge or not. To discuss metaphysics is not nonsense, for metaphysics is an attempt to explain something that is real. It is often really an inquiry after the facts and sometimes it is verified at some later time. To limit discussion to that which is verifiable at once is to really limit inquiry and hamper discovery. There is one other thing or point to say against the verifiability principle. If I say God’s son died on a cross, a logical positivist would be able to say that is nonsense, because I cannot verify it. I could then claim it is verified by the Bible, which quotes eyewitnesses to its happening and to events of miracles performed by God’s son as proof of His claim. The logical positivist could say that I cannot verify their accounts. But I could say that is to say George Washington was the first President of the United States was nonsense on the same ground.
In other words, the main objective to this principle is too narrow, too restrictive and too circular.
For a definition and explanation of the "Verifiability Principle", click on the title of this post.
I Think I Thunk Correctly
1968
It was Descartes hope to discover at least one undeniable and indubitable truth, and to accomplish this by logical reasoning. He proceeded to examine carefully all he knew of the world and concluded that his knowledge came through his senses, and the senses often fooled him. He then eliminated everything that depended on his senses. However, he stressed, while doing this, he had no intention of disputing practical matters. He allowed that the practical world must remain as it had been, despite his doubt of its existence in his search for truth. He felt it would not be wise for a person still dependent on the practical world to indulge in his exercise, and he noted that he did only because he was free from normal obligations. But he does mentally eliminate the practical world, including all its objects, even his own body. When he finished eliminating what his senses had given him, he was left with his mind, and he continued to carve away at it.
He had doubts, he realized; doubts concerning his own existence. But if he had doubts, then indeed, he did have something. He will always have something as long as he has doubts, even if there is some being who tried to deceive him into doubting that he had doubts. For even if he had doubts that he had doubts, he had a doubt. Descartes associated doubting and wondering with these doubts, which is what he had been doing with thinking. To doubt is to think. He concluded that to think is to exist.
This is certain, he felt. There was no denial of his thinking. There was possible denial of the world, of his body, of other men, of conversation, for his senses could twist and distort these, or he could have imagined them or dreamt them and still be convinced that they existed. But nothing could distort the fact that he was thinking. For distortion itself would be a thought. “I think, therefore, I am.”
But “I think” does not prove “I am”. Descartes could be perfectly correct about the existence of thinking, but he can only infer that the thinking is his. There is a thought. A thought does exist, but whether Descartes existed is not proven. This is the difficulty with his argument.
Can this difficulty be resolved? There is a certain extension of what Descartes has proved that can be developed. There is a thought, therefore there is something. There is something existing. It is thought, one single thought. But it is dynamic. It is dynamic because there also exists a question. That question is: Does anything exist that is certain and indubitable? The answer is: There is a thought. The thought asks the question. By asking the question and giving the answer, it creates a process. That process is thinking. And the process of thinking asks a second question: Do I exist? The answer is: Yes. There is a thought, therefore, there is an I. Then I exist. But whether I am Descartes or somebody else is irresolvable.
(For more information on Descartes philosophic views, click on the title of this post.)
Why Philosophy?
1968
There are two reasons. First, it expands the ability to approach other knowledge with an open mind, as well as approaching the world in general. Second, there is the discovery of the progression of thought through History and seeing how one philosophy led to another. For instance, the relationship of logical positivism with Socrates or the shift of emphasis from Hume to Kant.
There are disadvantages as well. Philosophy makes it difficult to ever accept anything as absolutely true. One will always be wary of a claim of fact, of a political speech, of am expert opinion. There is also a discouraging aspect philosophy. It often leads to a void or to fatalism. It is difficult to accept the idea that nothing is known for certain or that one’s life is determined by factors one has no control over.
But, perhaps, these things are fairly obvious in life anyway, and perhaps it is their obviousness that causes us such despair. And perhaps, then, philosophy can help to overcome the feeling, if not by providing answers, at least by occupying the mind with the search.
America
1968
America is a nation in search of itself. It has been a land of seekers from its very founding. The first people to settle America sought adventure or a new start in life, but whatever their reason for coming to the new world, most were out of step with the old. They were either bored with the life they had known or they were seeking freedom of belief. Having come with old world traditions, they soon developed their own life style. In time many colonists began to feel disconnected from the mother country. When they declared their final independence, the leaders of the colonies took the old and new and formed a new government upon a constitution of loosely framed law. This framework was so loose, the nation has been defining it ever since.
This government has operated for two hundred and is no longer new. The adventure of discovery is finished. The frontier is gone. The land is filled. Is America still a land of seekers?
It is. The loose framework of laws still needs definition and it is constantly challenged to resolve new problems. Conquering the frontier caused new difficulties, for America is still a land of seekers, who can no longer run off to the wilderness to start a new life. They must find it where they are. Once America sought to grow and find a place in the world. It has its place now.
Today America must define its position to its self and to the other nations. It seeks the answer of what it should mean to the world and the meaning it finds may be more important than anything that went before. The old search for expansion has ended; meanwhile, the seeking of place goes on.
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