Showing posts with label Socrates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Socrates. Show all posts

Monday, October 18, 2010

Memo to Socrates on Socrates to Memo




I

Fledgling Philosophies





Memo to Socrates on Socrates to Memo

1968

  Socrates attempted to show that knowledge is but recollection in his Memo. He appeared to succeed, but it can be asked whether he actually did.  He supported his theory by using a young slave boy to demonstrate what he was attempting to prove, but did this create a fallacy in his argument.  Just how cooperative was the slave to the two men who were his masters?  When the boy did what Socrates asked of him was it proof of Socrates’ theory of knowledge as recollection, or was it simply the slave’s attempt to please his masters?  This unanswerable question weakens Socrates method.  A second problem exists in the method itself.  Although Socrates denied any interference with the lad’s thinking; throughout, he led the boy along.

“Was this not so?”
“Yes, Socrates, it was.”
“Then was it not?”
“Yes, Socrates, it was.”
“And, then would not this be the case?”
“Oh indeed, Socrates, it shall be.”

         Socrates got to where he wished to go, but did the boy lead him or did he lead the boy?  Because of this question Socrates’ method is weakened, for it is impossible to say if Socrates really succeeded in his proof.  And, of course, if his proof is weakened, it also weakens his idea of a soul existing before and after death, or at least, before life.
         Still, there is another argument being considered in his dialogue: whether or not knowledge can be pursued.  After all, Memo asked at the beginning if it could. He said, if you know, you need not inquire, but if you do not know, you cannot inquire.  Socrates really set out to show Memo why this statement was wrong.  In this he did succeed.  It was not that the slave knew geometry from recollection at all, but that he knew a little about the subject and that he did agree with Socrates to please his masters; and thus, Socrates made the lad realize what he did not know, while at the same time, showed him he could learn if he tried.
         In essence, Socrates showed that to know about something and to not know something, does not mean you know everything or are unable to know anything.  In fact, he showed you must first know what you do not know about something before you can begin to try to know it. And in this argument, Socrates succeeded.

(Click on the title of this post for more on Socrates.)

On Meaninglessness


1968



         It would seem in the verifiability principle the notion of meaninglessness is pivotal.  That is, the meaninglessness notion is basic for its acceptance, or if we can dispute the notion of meaninglessness used by the logical positivists, we can then dispute the verifiability principle.  Of course, the logical positivist will probably argue back at us if we question the term of meaninglessness saying we are dealing in metaphysics ourselves and therefore are talking nonsense.  This is a great problem in itself with the logical positivist’s verifiability principle.  It is self-protective.  Let me use a clearer example of what I mean.  A faith healer says he cured someone, but then the person says they were not cured and accuses the faith healer of being a fake.  "Not at all," says the faith healer, "I’m not a fake.  You just didn’t believe hard enough."  This may seem a good argument, being one that cannot be disputed and thus is exactly the thing that happens with the verifiability principle.  However, there seems to be a shortcoming to the principle.  And that is in determining where to draw the line between speculation and verifiability.
         Is it meaningful or meaningless for me to say the world is round?  It is meaningful, because after all, the world is round, and I could fly around it and see that it was round.  But was it meaningful or not to say the world was round in 1490?  It was in dispute at the time.  Many people apparently believed the world was flat, that it had edges, yet some people believed it was round.  Was it then nonsense to think it was round and you could sail around it if you had a boat strong enough and supplies enough?  Was it not metaphysical to discuss the possibility that the world was round when it was believed by the science of the time to be flat?  It could be said that it wasn’t because soon afterward a man did sail about the world and prove it round, but this is after the fact.  Was it not nonsense to say the world was round when it could not be verified by experience?  Yet, there were clues.  The curve of the sky, for one, and probably observations of the moon, but these did not really verify anything about the shape of the earth.  The point of all this is how does one know what is metaphysical and what is not?  To speculate about God would be metaphysical, but there are clues which would lead one to believe in God, and other clues to cause speculation on the nature of this God.  But is to speak of God nonsense because we cannot bring him over and introduce him?  Is it any more nonsensical to speak of the soul of God or the limits of space then it was to believe the world was round in 1490?
         To clear up this point, we can look back to Socrates and Memo.  In a way, they begin with the same argument - Whether it is possible to inquire after knowledge or not.  To discuss metaphysics is not nonsense, for metaphysics is an attempt to explain something that is real.  It is often really an inquiry after the facts and sometimes it is verified at some later time.  To limit discussion to that which is verifiable at once is to really limit inquiry and hamper discovery.  There is one other thing or point to say against the verifiability principle.  If I say God’s son died on a cross, a logical positivist would be able to say that is nonsense, because I cannot verify it.  I could then claim it is verified by the Bible, which quotes eyewitnesses to its happening and to events of miracles performed by God’s son as proof of His claim.  The logical positivist could say that I cannot verify their accounts.  But I could say that is to say George Washington was the first President of the United States was nonsense on the same ground.
         In other words, the main objective to this principle is too narrow, too restrictive and too circular.

For a definition and explanation of the "Verifiability Principle", click on the title of this post.

Why Philosophy?


1968

         There are two reasons.  First, it expands the ability to approach other knowledge with an open mind, as well as approaching the world in general.  Second, there is the discovery of the progression of thought through History and seeing how one philosophy led to another.  For instance, the relationship of logical positivism with Socrates or the shift of emphasis from Hume to Kant.
         There are disadvantages as well.  Philosophy makes it difficult to ever accept anything as absolutely true.  One will always be wary of a claim of fact, of a political speech, of am expert opinion.  There is also a discouraging aspect philosophy. It often leads to a void or to fatalism.  It is difficult to accept the idea that nothing is known for certain or that one’s life is determined by factors one has no control over.
         But, perhaps, these things are fairly obvious in life anyway, and perhaps it is their obviousness that causes us such despair.  And perhaps, then, philosophy can help to overcome the feeling, if not by providing answers, at least by occupying the mind with the search.