Just Hume Kant be Modified?

Just Hume Kant be Modified?

1968

         Where as David Hume took the position that A Priori Knowledge is not concerned with anything in the world, Kant argues that A Priori Knowledge is very necessary to our understanding of the world and to empirical knowledge itself.  Kant divides our knowledge into two categories, which he calls synthetic and analytic.  Analytic judgment is that in which the predicate can readily be deduced from the subject.  Kant’s example is that all bodies are extended, a fact he claims is known because being extended is bound up with the concept of body.  A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate is an additive to the subject which can only be asserted through observation and experience, and his example of this is all bodies have weight.  In other words, empirical knowledge is synthetic and A Priori Knowledge is analytic.  Of course, we can argue that in his example the concept of extension is as elusive to pure reason as the concept of weight.  Would not one have to see that bodies do extend into space to know that they extend into space?  A blind man in a free-gravity area would have no more conception of his extension then he would of his weight.

         This would be a small and mote point, except it argues against Kant’s very basic claim, and if so, weakens his whole.  However, let us consider that his analytic and synthetic knowledge is completely acceptable.  How is A Priori valuable to our world?  Kant tells us it is valuable because it is the basic beginning for the synthetic.  That is, if we strip away each layer of our synthetic knowledge, we always come back to another question that leads to another on to another and eventually we come to one that we accept some knowledge not from experience, but from A Priori.

         Kant finds A Priori to be both necessary and outside our experience. He uses as an example the equation 5 + 7 = 12.  We cannot experience this equation in itself, but yet we accept it, and we know it is set and unchangeable. We could examine five by building to five on our fingers, and seven by laying down sticks, and from this we could begin seeing the twelve, but in itself it stands alone.  Yet, is this as it seems?  That is, first, is 5 + 7 = 12 really seen intuitively or through A Priori, or is it accepted as final proof of already gathered experience?  Five fingers and seven sticks equals twelve has been experienced so often that the acceptance of 5 + 7 = 12 is automatic, but posteriori.  Consider the equation 2 + 3 = 5.  By Kant’s argument this would be A Priori, for we deduce the predicate from the subject, but where have we deduced the actual proposition 5?  The Hottentots can only count to three.  After three is many.  Do we have A Priori that 2 + 3 = many?  No, for we would not be certain that five is many.  Can the Hottentots look at 2 + 3 = 5 and know it A Priori?  No, not unless he can learn the concept of five, which is still agreeable to the definition of A Priori.  But to learn the concept of five, he would have to experience it.  Two fingers, three, four, five; ah, five!  Two fingers, he understands, and three also, and now five! If he holds up these two, it is two, and now these other three, and it is five!  He just experienced 2 + 3 = 5.  But if he held up two and just put them down, and then held up three and put them down, he may never see five, although he might understand the concept.  He must experience it.

For information on David Hume, click on the title of this post.

Distinctions Hume Kant Miss!

DISTINCTIONS HUME KANT MISS!

1968 

                                                                                           

         The relationship between Hume and Kant’s distinctions can be briefly summed-up by making a small chart and placing within it the ideas, or rather the theories, of each man under the headings.  It is not intended that this chart force a strict adherence to any set rule or category.  It is obvious that there are differences in the meaning of each category, but we are trying to show simply how Kant and Hume are similar.  In a way, they were working within the same theory, only differing to the degree to which they extended each part.  For instance, Hume accepted A Priori, but felt it had no real concern in the real world, while Kant felt that A Priori Knowledge was very necessary to our understanding of the world.  One could almost agree with both, if it was not a contradiction to do so.  In the end, Kant had the sounder theory. And that is the main difference between them, for it is in a contradiction.  Hume felt A Priori Knowledge, which he called matter of fact, was of no concern because there was nothing we could do about it.  Kant called A Priori analytic in his theory, but argued that it was necessary, not that we could do anything about it, but that certain knowledge that was A Priori was important to our understanding of certain sciences and events in out world.  In other words, the difference between Kant and Hume was that Hume felt A Priori was not concerned with the real world and Kant felt it was necessary for a real understanding of the real world. 

         The similarities between the two theories are shown in the chart below by relation of category under A priori and Empirical knowledge.

         A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE   |   EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

    _________________________________________________________ HUME  matter of fact                  |       relations of ideas

    _________________________________________________________                       KANT         analytic                          |       synthetic                                

    _________________________________________________________                      

Is This Rationalist Really Necessary?

  

1968

                                                                                                             

            Hume does not seem concerned with finding any one certain truth, nor does he seem concerned with any philosophy of A Priori.  In fact, he disputes any such thing as necessary truth.  Such a thing is irrelevant to our existence. To argue the question of existence is irrelevant.  Existence cannot be proved by any argument and will end in circular discussion.  It is not, however, that Hume completely dismisses A Priori.  He says it has nothing to do with the world.  It has to do with the relations of ideas, but nothing to do with the world, for even if some point is granted A priori, such as a square always having four equal sides, did not exist in reality it would still be what its laws dictate it to be in conception.

            We have matters of fact, however, that do exist and are relevant.  But they are not A priori and cannot be discovered by reason alone, deduced in isolation.  They must be experienced, and even then they are not, like a priori, indisputable.  To make a statement of fact about the world, such as “fire is hot” is not to be unable to question the statement.  We know fire is hot only through our experience with fire, but it could not be wrong for someone to say that fire is cold. It would be possible that fire is cold if we had never experienced its hotness.  It is not altogether inconceivable that there could be a fire that would feel cold to our bodies.  Some fire might feel cool when we are ill.  We could say the moon is made of green cheese, for though it is improbable, it is not impossible.  It would be possible to argue the statement that I think not, therefore, I am not.  If I make the statement I think not, who can dispute me, since only I can experience my own thoughts, or the lack of them?  Of course, it could be claimed that to say I think not is to think it and therefore is a contradiction.

            Hume is concerned with cause and effect.  He feels that philosophers have generally attributed actions within the world to the operation of cause and effect, but that such relations cannot be proved.  We observe an action, such as a billiard ball striking another of its kind, and we come to expect a certain reaction, but it is only through experience that we know that one particular action will take place.  It would not be wrong to say that the cue ball will strike the eight ball and the eight ball will remain stationary while the cue ball flies off the table.  Such an event would happen if the eight ball were nailed to the table.  We cannot make any certain statement from this knowledge without further experience; that of observing what does happen.  What if the nail is very loose in the wood?  What will happen?  Will the nail hold or not? We cannot know without experiencing it.  Of course, we could argue that some things are cause and effect and we can be certain of some particular thing occurring again if it has been observed exactly that way every time in the pass.  But here we delude ourselves in two ways.  One, we often become so used to a certain effect we start believing it is A Priori and not experience showing us what will happen.  And two, we believe it will always happen the same way over and over when something is similar.  We would expect a large ripe apple to taste good and juicy but if we bite into it, we discover a wax replica, which will not taste good and juicy.  Here was a similar object that did not behave as we expected, a matter of fact that we learn only through experience.  By the same token, it is not wrong to say Hume was wrong.  Who is experienced in all knowledge?

For more on David Hume and his philosophic viewpoints, click on the title of this post. It will take you to, History of Philosophy -- David Hume by Alfred Weber

Why Philosophy?

1968

         There are two reasons.  First, it expands the ability to approach other knowledge with an open mind, as well as approaching the world in general.  Second, there is the discovery of the progression of thought through History and seeing how one philosophy led to another.  For instance, the relationship of logical positivism with Socrates or the shift of emphasis from Hume to Kant.

         There are disadvantages as well.  Philosophy makes it difficult to ever accept anything as absolutely true.  One will always be wary of a claim of fact, of a political speech, of am expert opinion.  There is also a discouraging aspect philosophy. It often leads to a void or to fatalism.  It is difficult to accept the idea that nothing is known for certain or that one’s life is determined by factors one has no control over.

         But, perhaps, these things are fairly obvious in life anyway, and perhaps it is their obviousness that causes us such despair.  And perhaps, then, philosophy can help to overcome the feeling, if not by providing answers, at least by occupying the mind with the search.